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after they have been distilled in the alembic of the philosopher as they did before. However, he does not overlook the prefatory permission to skip; and, moreover, he willingly shares the author's hope that, at some future time, it will not "be a vain undertaking to present even in outline the facts of purposive psychology." When that time shall have come, we can tell better than now whether psychology, either in itself or in its applications, is enriched by a doctrine of the purposive soul. At present, the volume under consideration furnishes new evidence that the successful application of psychological facts and laws to the arts and the professions rests, in large measure, upon differential psychology,—a *causal* branch of the science. In making clever use of the psychology of individual differences, the author, who has a sympathetic and kindly interest in the affairs of practical life, has given us the best brief account of the applications that our language affords.

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What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel. By BENEDETTO CROCE. Translated from the original text of the third Italian edition (1912) by DOUGLAS AINSLIE. London, Macmillan and Company, 1915.—pp. xviii, 217.

As the title indicates, the aim of the present volume is two-fold. On the one hand, the author hopes to set forth what seems to him the basic truth for which Hegel contended, and which he has left as a legacy to later thinkers; while, on the other hand, he is interested in disclosing the error into which Hegel permitted himself to fall—the error which is the fountain-head of the well-known difficulties experienced by the student of Hegel. "It is not my intention," he informs us, "to offer in these pages a complete exposition of Hegel's system, nor even of his logical doctrine; but rather to concentrate all attention upon the most characteristic part of his thought, upon the new aspects of truth revealed by him, and upon the errors which he allowed to persist or in which he became entangled" (p. 8).

The most characteristic part of the Hegelian system, the part with which the author finds himself in complete agreement and which he thinks all must admit the truth of, is the doctrine of the synthesis of opposites, the doctrine which Hegel called *dialectic*—"a most simple principle, and so obvious that it deserves to be placed among those symbolized by the egg of Christopher Columbus" (p. 19). "The opposites are not illusion, neither is unity illusion. The opposites

are opposed to one another, but they are not opposed to unity. For true and concrete unity is nothing but the unity, or synthesis, of opposites. It is not immobility, it is movement. It is not fixity, but development. The philosophic concept is a concrete universal, and therefore a thinking of reality as at once united and divided. Only thus does philosophic truth correspond to poetic truth, and the pulse of thought beat with the pulse of things" (pp. 19-20). The concrete universal, "with its synthesis of opposites, expresses life and not the corpse of life; it gives the *physiology*, not the *anatomy*, of the real" (p. 21).

Having stated what he regards as the essence of the Hegelian dialectic, the author next proceeds to defend it against certain objections which have been more or less frequently raised against it, but which, he thinks, are based upon misconception of its real nature. The objection, for example, that the opposites in the triad, if *identical* as Hegel tries to prove they are, cannot give the dialectical advance is based upon a confusion between the merely negative aspect of the dialectic and its positive content (p. 25). Another objection, that the dialectic tacitly introduces an element of sense or intuition, forgets that Hegel "has destroyed that false concept of a barren and formal logic as an arbitrary abstraction, and to the true logical concept he has given a character of concreteness . . ." (p. 27). Nor does the doctrine of the synthesis of opposites destroy the principle of identity and contradiction. "So far from destroying the principle of identity, Hegel gives it new life and force, makes it what truly it ought to be and what in ordinary thought it is not. . . . If attention be paid to the words of Hegel alone, we might say that he does not believe in the principle of identity; but if we look closer, we see that what Hegel does not believe in is the *fallacious use of the principle of identity*—the use made of it by those abstract thinkers who retain unity by cancelling opposition, or retain opposition by cancelling unity; or, as he says, the principle of identity taken as a 'law of the abstract intellect'" (pp. 30-31).

This doctrine of the synthesis of opposites, which, though implicit in the development of philosophy from the beginning (chapter II), is, nevertheless, "to be considered a true and original discovery of Hegel" (p. 49), leads to a new conception of reality. "All the dualities, all the fissures, all the *hiatus*, and, so to speak, all the rents and wounds with which reality shows itself to be lacerated by the abstract intellect, are filled, closed and healed. A complete unity (*gediegene Einheit*) is realized: the coherence of the organic whole is re-estab-

lished; blood and life again circulate within it" (pp. 52-53). What is real is rational, and what is rational is real. Hegel can be called neither an optimist nor a pessimist. "Good and evil are opposed and correlative terms; and the affirmation of the one is the affirmation of the other. Hegel, who denies both, while preserving both in the dialectic synthesis, is beyond both optimism and pessimism, high up on that philosophic Olympus, where there is neither laughter nor tears; for laughter and tears have become objects for spirit, and their agitation is overcome in the serenity of thought, as in the concreteness of life" (pp. 59-60). Nor is Hegel to be considered merely a conservative spirit in the realm of politics. His conception of life "was so philosophical that conservatism, revolution, and restoration, each in turn, finds its justification in it" (p. 66). For the Hegelian philosophy all history, "the very reality of the idea," becomes sacred history; it is radically irreligious because it resolves religion into itself, and yet it is supremely religious because it seeks to satisfy in a rational manner the need for religion (pp. 69-71).

"The perpetual youth of the Hegelian philosophy, its indomitable vigour, its unexhausted fecundity lie, then, in the logical doctrine, and in the thought effectively in conformity with that doctrine. And its vigour, fecundity, and youth are increasingly apparent even in our own day, which is marked by a new efflorescence of neurotic mysticism, and of insincere religiosity, by an antihistorical barbarism engendered by positivism, and the Jacobinism which frequently ensues in these conditions. Whoever feels the dignity of man and the dignity of thought can find satisfaction in no other solution of conflicts and of dualisms than in the dialectical, the solution won by the genius of Hegel" (p. 71).

Despite the fact that the author discovers such an indisputable and basic principle in the Hegelian system, he is convinced that the system is vitiated by an equally basic error which serves as the justification for the objection commonly raised by critics of Hegel that his system is abstract, intellectualistic, and full of arbitrary assertions which are contrary to fact. The rest of the book is devoted to the disclosure of this error and the consequences which it entails.

Summarily stated, the error consists in confusing the theory of opposites with the theory of distincts. The theory of opposites we have already considered, and is illustrated by the first triad of the dialectic, namely, *being*, *non-being*, and *becoming*. Opposites taken out of relation to each other are not concepts, but only abstractions; thus, being and non-being apart from becoming are pure abstractions.

In the dialectic of opposites, therefore, the only concrete concept is the synthesis; thesis and antithesis, apart from the synthesis, are vacuous. This, however, is not true of 'distinct' concepts. These are "not in a relation of mutual indifference, but of lower and higher degree" (p. 86). The relation between distincts, therefore, is not the same as the relation between opposites. For of two distinct concepts, for example, art and philosophy, intuition and thought, and so forth, while the one may be abstract without the other, yet, in connection with the other, it is equally real and concrete. "a and b [art and philosophy] are two concepts, the second of which would be abstract without the first, but which, in connection with the first, is as real and concrete as it is" (p. 90). It is erroneous, therefore, to conceive of the connection of distincts and the connection of opposites as being one and the same; to treat the relation of degrees dialectically, in the manner of the dialectic of opposites, is not permissible. This Hegel did, and herein lies his fatal blunder. "The error is not such as can be corrected incidentally, nor is it an error of diction: it is an essential error . . . from it arises, if I am not mistaken, all that is philosophically erroneous in the system of Hegel" (pp. 98-99).

"The application of the dialectic of opposites to the relation of distincts, carried out with full logical seriousness . . . was bound to entail, as it did, a double consequence. On the one hand, what are *philosophical errors* came to acquire the dignity of partial or particular concepts, that is, of *distinct concepts*; and on the other, what are really *distinct concepts* were lowered to the level of simple attempts at truth, to incomplete and imperfect truths; that is to say, they assume the aspect of *philosophical errors*" (p. 100). The first result of this confusion is seen in the structure of the *Logic* where errors (the categories?) are treated as distinct concepts and where the attempt is made to apply to error the method proper to truth (p. 111). The second result is most clearly evident in the philosophy of history and the philosophy of nature; the absurdities that arise from this confusion in Hegel's thought are here very numerous, the crowning absurdity of them all being the application of the dialectic to individual facts and empirical concepts.

Space will not allow us to follow further the author's detailed discussion of the manifold difficulties into which Hegel finds himself plunged by his failure to differentiate between the theory of opposites and the theory of distinct concepts. But with the statement of this confusion of thought we have before us the essence of our author's criticism. With this statement our summary of the book must conclude.

With the purpose of the book the present reviewer finds himself in hearty accord. He is convinced that the system of Hegel is only partly vital, that there is much of it which must be relegated to the curiosity-shop of philosophical antiquities, and that, when this is done, the message which Hegel has for the present day will be more easily understood. He, therefore, welcomes every serious effort, such as this volume exemplifies, to separate the wheat from the chaff, the living from the dead, of the Hegelian philosophy. But he is constrained to question whether the philosopher of Naples has been able—in the enthusiastic words of the translator's introduction—"to unravel the gorgeous yet tangled skein of his [Hegel's] system, and supply to all future students the clue of Ariadne."

In the first place, Croce's interpretation of the Hegelian doctrine of the concrete universal raises doubts and perplexities in the reader's mind. He apparently makes that doctrine to all intents and purposes synonymous with the dialectic of opposites, the synthesis of abstract elements, such as is illustrated by the first triad of the *Logic*; and, what is more serious, he conceives of the 'moments' of the synthesis, that is, thesis and antithesis, as mere abstract opposites which have absolutely no significance except in their reference to the synthesis. To me, at least, this is directly contrary to Hegel's real meaning. I had all along supposed that the doctrine of the concrete universal possessed no necessary connection with the famous—or infamous—dialectic; certainly it had never occurred to me that the *concreteness* of the synthesis is to be found in the fact that it synthesizes two disparate and empty abstractions! It has long been my conviction that the dialectic, as it is illustrated in the *Logic*, has little value except in a very vague and general application: but I have also felt that the doctrine of the concrete universal is the one in which Hegel brings to fruition the spirit of the Critical Philosophy. If I am mistaken in this, all I can say is that the Hegelian doctrine of the concrete universal is by far less significant than I had come to think. If Croce's interpretation is right, then let us send the concrete universal to the lumber-room too!

The author's main contention, that Hegel confuses the doctrine of the synthesis of opposites with that of the synthesis of 'distincts,' likewise seems to me erroneous. As I read Hegel, what he really preaches is only the doctrine of distincts, the doctrine of the degrees of reality if one prefers, and not the doctrine of the synthesis of 'opposites' at all. If by 'opposites' are meant abstract and vacuous terms, which, taken by themselves, are absolutely without meaning,

then I cannot see that the doctrine of opposites is anywhere admitted by Hegel. Even in the first triad of the *Logic*—the triad which Croce constantly cites as the best example of the synthesis of opposites—thesis and antithesis are not ‘opposites’ in this sense. As Hegel views the matter, ‘being’ certainly has an element of truth in it and is, therefore, not a bare abstraction; and the same is equally true of ‘non-being.’ Of course, Hegel does say that becoming is the first concrete concept, and that being and non-being are abstract; but he also says that the whole section of the *Logic* entitled Being, of which this first triad is only a very small part, is abstract as compared with the last section, the Notion, which is concrete. The aim of the dialectic “is to study things in their own being and movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories of the understanding” (*Enc.*, section 81; italics mine). The truth of the matter seems to be that Hegel thought of being, non-being, becoming, and the other categories as ‘distincts,’ degrees of reality, and not as opposites—a view which becomes more and more explicit as the dialectic advance goes on. And besides this theory of the synthesis of degrees the dialectic seems to me to have no other meaning.

What confusion there is here, then, would appear to emerge from the misinterpretation which Croce places upon the Hegelian thought. And, if I am not mistaken, the critic’s misinterpretation is to be traced ultimately to his tacit assumption that the categories with which the *Logic* deals are high and lifted up, possessing no reference to perception at all (cf. pp. 26–27),—an assumption which, I am firmly convinced, is wholly without justification. But, as Kipling would say, “that is another story.”

I am glad to be able to end this review with a word of praise. The discussion is exceedingly stimulating and suggestive; time spent in reading it is time well spent. For the anti-historical spirit of the present day it is an admirable antidote. The book is beautifully printed. The reader could wish that time had been taken to add an index.

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The Idealistic Reaction Against Science. By PROFESSOR ALIOTTA. Translated by AGNES McCASKELL. London, Macmillan & Co. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. xiii, 483.

We are indebted to Miss Agnes McCaskill for this excellent translation of a work by Professor Aliotta of the Royal University of Padua. The book falls naturally into two parts: the former consisting